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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Petition Without Proper Notice 
Mr. Kellis has argued that the district court erred in summarily dismissing certain of his 
claims for post-conviction relief on grounds not asserted by the state in its motion and brief in 
support of summary dismissal. The state has argued that so long as it asserts that Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), applies or states that the petitioner's 
allegation is speculative, bare, conclusory, unsubstantiated by any fact, and inadequate to entitle 
him to an evidentiary hearing, this "touch[ es]" upon both prongs of Strickland, so that the district 
court may summarily dismiss without further notice, even when the district court's analysis of 
Strickland's application is different from the state's. 
Simply citing Strickland or asserting that claims are speculative, bare, conclusory, and 
unsubstantiated by any fact does not give the notice required for summary dismissal. 
The case law holds: 
Because a post-conviction relief proceeding is governed by the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a motion for summary disposition must 'state with particularity 
the grounds there.' 
DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,601,200 P.3d 1149, 1160 (internal citation omitted) (quoting 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,322,900 P.2d 796, 798 (1995); I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l). 
[W]here a trial court dismisses a claim based upon grounds other than those 
offered- by the State's motion for summary dismissal, and accompanying 
memoranda the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be provided with 
a 20-day notice period. Where the dismissal is based upon the grounds offered by 
the State, additional notice is unnecessary. When a trial court summarily 
dismisses an application for post-conviction relief based in part on the arguments 
presented by the State, this is sufficient to meet the notice requirements. 
Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010), (citations and emphasis 
omitted). 
The question before this Court is how broadly or narrowly to read this requirement of 
independent 20-day notice when claims are summarily dismissed on arguments and analysis 
different from those offered by the state in its motion and brief in support of summary dismissal. 
DeRushe, Kelly, and their predecessors - Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 164 P.3d 798 
(2007), and Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 P.3d 123 (Ct. App. 2009) - all took a restrictive 
reading of the independent 20-day notice requirement. And, that is the reading of the 
requirement that the state again argues for in this case. 
However, those cases were all decided before Murphy v. State, No. 40483, _Idaho_, 
_ P.3d __ , 2014 WL 712695 Feb. 25, 2014,pet.for rehearing pending, radically changed 
the scope of post-conviction review in Idaho. 
As this Court is aware, post-conviction is the only means of raising claims of 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel except in those rare cases where the proof of the 
ineffectiveness does not require any evidence not contained in the criminal case record and 
transcripts. For the vast majority of defendants, Idaho's appellate courts will not address claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. State v. Hays, 138 Idaho 761, 766, 69 P.3d 
181, 186 (Ct. App. 2003). 
As this Court is also aware, Idaho has held that there is no right to effective assistance of 
counsel in post-conviction. Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340,342, 160 P.3d 1276, 1277 (Ct. 
App. 2007); Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897,902,908 P.2d 590,595 (Ct. App. 1995). 
However, there may in fact be a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel in those cases wherein collateral proceedings are the first occasion to raise a claim of 
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ineffective assistance at trial or on appeal. The United States Supreme Court wrote in Martinez 
v. Ryan: 
Coleman v. Thompson, [501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991)] left open, and the 
Court of Appeals in this case addressed, a question of constitutional law: whether 
a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide 
the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. These 
proceedings can be called, for purposes of this opinion, 'initial-review collateral 
proceedings.' Coleman had suggested, though without holding that the 
Constitution may require States to provide counsel in initial-review collateral 
proceedings because 'in [these] cases ... state collateral review is the first place a 
prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction.' Id., at 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546. 
As Coleman noted, this makes the initial-review collateral proceeding a prisoner's 
'one and only appeal' as to an ineffective-assistance claim, id., at 756, 111 S.Ct. 
2546 ( emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted), and this may justify an 
exception to the constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral 
proceedings. See id., at 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 
353,357, 83 S.Ct. 814 (1963) (holding States must appoint counsel on a 
prisoner's first appeal). 
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). 
Martinez also leaves this question open. Id. However, Martinez does hold that 
ineffective assistance of counsel in an initial-review collateral proceeding on a claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial may provide cause for a procedural default in a federal habeas 
proceeding. Id. 
Idaho law used to provide for a forum to adequately raise constitutional ineffective 
assistance of trial and direct appeal counsel claims - because Idaho held that ineffective 
assistance of initial post-conviction counsel could constitute a "sufficient reason" under LC. § 
19-4908 to allow a petitioner to raise a claim in a successive petition. Palmer v. Dermitt, l 02 
Idaho 591,635 P.2d 955 (1981). This allowed defendants to have valid claims eventually heard 
in post-conviction even if initial post-conviction counsel was ineffective as to not properly raise 
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the claim in the initial petition. However, the Idaho Supreme Court recently overruled Palmer 
and held that "sufficient reason" under LC. § 19-4908 for a successive petition does not include 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Murphy, supra. 
A petition for rehearing remains pending in Murphy. If the petition is denied and Murphy 
remains the law, Idaho may become the state that forces the United States Supreme Court to 
conclusively hold that there is a right to effective assistance of counsel in the initial-review 
collateral proceedings raising ineffective assistance of trial and direct appeal counsel. And, 
Murphy, if not reversed on rehearing, will certainly push all the claims of ineffective assistance 
that would have been raised in successive petitions into the federal courts for an initial hearing. 
Martinez, supra. 
Should Murphy remain the law, this Court should end the prior practice of giving a 
restrictive reading to the requirement for an independent 20-day notice when the district court 
dismisses on grounds different from those articulated and argued by the state in its motion for 
summary judgment and brief in support. As this Court is aware, Idaho's current public defense 
system is underfunded and overburdened. National Legal Aid & Defender Association January 
2010 Report, Advocacy and Due Process in Idaho's Trial Courts. Unfortunately, an effect of this 
is inevitably ineffective assistance both in direct criminal and post-conviction proceedings. Id. 
An independent 20-day notice from a court anticipating summary dismissal of a petition on 
grounds different from those "touched" on by the state in its filings gives the petitioner and 
counsel actual notice of what is thought lacking in the petition and evidence in support. At that 
point, petitioner and counsel can remedy the deficiency if possible. If not, the petition can be 
properly dismissed. The independent 20-day notice can prevent years of excess litigation at high 
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expense to the state in the state appellate courts and the federal courts. In the interests of judicial 
economy, protection of the right to counsel, and due process, if Murphy remains the law, this 
Court should hold that something more than mentioning Strickland is required to give notice of 
the basis for summary dismissal. 
Mr. Kellis would ask this Court to suspend proceedings in this case pending resolution of 
Murphy. 
However, if this Court does not suspend this case, pending Murphy, Mr. Kellis requests 
relief. Indeed, even if this Court continues to take a restrictive view of the requirement of notice 
prior to summary dismissal, as set forth in the Opening Brief, the district court dismissed certain 
of the subclaims of ineffective assistance of counsel on grounds different from those noted by the 
state in its motion and brief in support of summary dismissal without giving an independent 20-
day notice. Therefore, the dismissal was improper. Had notice been provided, Mr. Kellis could 
have either produced admissible evidence to support his claims and the matter proceeded to a 
hearing, or the court could have properly dismissed. Without the notice and Mr. Kellis' 
additional evidence, this Court cannot know whether summary dismissal was appropriate. 
Therefore, reversal and remand for further proceedings is required. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Kellis asks that this Court 
reverse the order of summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this~ day of May, 2014. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Timothy 
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